Tweaking Tinker: Redefining an Outdated Standard for the Internet Era by Raley, Shannon M.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2011
Tweaking Tinker: Redefining an Outdated
Standard for the Internet Era
Shannon M. Raley
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Education Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cleveland
State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Note, Tweaking Tinker: Redefining an Outdated Standard for the Internet Era , 59 Clev. St. L. Rev. 773 (2011)
  
 
773 
TWEAKING TINKER: REDEFINING AN OUTDATED 
STANDARD FOR THE INTERNET ERA 
SHANNON M. RALEY* 
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 774 
 II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE TINKER STANDARD ........................ 777 
A. The Beginning of Student Free Speech Regulation— 
 Tinker v. Des Moines .................................................. 777 
B. Expanding Speech Restrictions—Bethel School  
 District v. Fraser .......................................................... 778 
C. Further Expansion of Tinker—Hazelwood School  
 District v. Kuhlmeier ................................................... 779 
D. The Final Clarification of Student Speech Restriction— 
 Morse v. Frederick ....................................................... 780 
 III. TINKER’S “ON-CAMPUS” REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE  
  ELIMINATED ........................................................................ 782 
A. The Internet’s Influence on Students ........................... 783 
B. The Difficulties Schools Face in Enforcing Limits  
 on the Internet .............................................................. 785 
C. Arguments for the Elimination of Tinker’s “On-Campus” 
 Requirement ................................................................. 786 
1. Federal Courts Disregard the “On-Campus”  
 Requirement for Internet-Related Cases .............. 787 
2. Retention of the “On-Campus” Requirement Leads  
 to Abuse of Students’ First Amendment Rights ... 789 
3. Retention of Tinker’s “On-Campus” Requirement  
 Threatens the Safety of Teachers, Students, and  
 Other School Personnel ........................................ 793 
 IV. TINKER’S SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION TEST SHOULD BE  
  BETTER DEFINED ................................................................. 795 
 V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 798 
 
                                                          
 *  J.D., Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law (expected May 
2012); B.A., University of Notre Dame. The author would like to thank the members of the 
Cleveland State Law Review for their unwavering dedication to this publication. She would 
like to thank her mother, Laura Brady, for being a constant source of inspiration. Finally, 
above all, the author would like to thank her husband, Rick Raley, for his insight, support, and 
unconditional love.  
 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011
774 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:783 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
After a high school party in Minnesota, several partygoers “posted” pictures from 
their night onto the popular social networking site Facebook, which made the 
pictures available for public viewing.1  Officials from Eden Prairie High School 
discovered the pictures, many of which contained underage drinking, and suspended 
over 100 students based on the pictures’ contents.2  This story starkly demonstrates 
the phenomenon that while many students are aware of the potential risks associated 
with posting information on social networking sites,3 the risks have done little to 
deter students from using these sites.4  Thus, public schools are increasingly required 
to evaluate the bounds of their authority in disciplining students for their activities 
on the Internet.  
Despite this need for constant evaluation, the Supreme Court has provided little 
guidance to public schools on the issue of what student Internet speech may be 
regulated without infringing upon the students’ First Amendment rights.  While the 
lack of Supreme Court guidance has undoubtedly caused confusion among public 
schools, a greater amount of uncertainty surrounding this issue exists in the lower 
courts.  The Third Circuit’s decisions in Layshock v. Hermitage School District5 and 
Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District,6 handed down on the same day, poignantly 
illustrate this area’s unsettled nature.  Both cases involve public school students who 
received extended suspensions7 after they created offensive MySpace pages of their 
respective principals.8  Both students sued their school districts, alleging that their 
suspensions violated their First Amendment right of free speech.9  Despite the nearly 
                                                          
 1 See Mary Lynn Smith & Courtney Blanchard, Facebook Photos Land Eden Prairie 
Kids in Trouble, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Jan. 9, 2008, at 1B, available at 2008 
WLNR 883534. 
 2 Id.  
 3 One Eden Prairie student stated that “[i]t’s dumb to have these pictures up on the 
Internet,” because of the potential consequences they create.  Id.  Another stated that she does 
not “put bad stuff on [her] page,” because of the risks associated with them.  Id.  By posting 
pictures of illegal activities or comments containing offensive or harassing language on the 
Internet, students risk the possibility of suspensions, see, e.g., Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. 
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), or even criminal charges, see Rob Quinn, 
Teens Arrested Over Facebook Prank, NEWSER (Jan. 14, 2011, 10:26 AM), 
http://www.newser.com/story/109697/teens-arrested-over-facebook-prank.html. 
 4 See FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited Nov. 15, 
2011) (estimating that Facebook has over 800 million active users). 
 5 Layshock, 593 F.3d 249. 
 6 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 7 Layshock, 593 F.3d at 254; Snyder, 593 F.3d at 293 (stating that both students received 
ten day out-of-school suspensions).  
 8 See Layshock, 593 F.3d at 252-53; Snyder, 593 F.3d at 291. 
 9 Layshock, 593 F.3d at 245-55; Snyder, 593 F.3d at 294-95. For background information 
on the First Amendment, see generally U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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identical facts of each case, the Third Circuit reached opposite conclusions regarding 
the students’ First Amendment rights.10 
The conflicting results of these cases indicate that a clarification of current 
precedent is necessary to integrate Internet-originated speech.  Under the current 
precedent established in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District,11 a student’s right of free speech may be regulated only if the speech 1) 
originates on school grounds and 2) would substantially disrupt school operations or 
interfere with the rights of others.12  However, this standard cannot adequately 
encompass situations that arise in today’s Internet-centered world because a great 
deal of Internet-originated speech does not occur “on-campus” and courts are unsure 
of what exactly constitutes a “substantial disruption” as required by Tinker.13  
First, Tinker and its progeny14 involved actions by students that occurred directly 
on school grounds, such as silent protests in the classrooms or speeches given in the 
school’s auditorium.15  Although courts routinely emphasize that student speech can 
only be regulated if it occurs “on-campus,” such a requirement has become virtually 
meaningless considering that the nature of the Internet makes it both “nowhere and 
everywhere at the same time . . . .”16  Given the Internet’s imperceptible existence, 
Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement creates a confusing and illogical requisite.  
Furthermore, because students may access the Internet from school computers, as 
well as their own computers and cell phones brought into the school, Tinker creates a 
strange disciplinary system allowing First Amendment protections only when 
Internet speech is said outside of school boundaries, despite the speech occurring 
over the same medium.  Consider the following example.  One student uses her cell 
phone while walking out of the school doors at the end of the school day to post a 
harassing comment about a teacher that is later discovered.  At the same time, 
another student uses his cell phone inside the school, posts the same kind of 
comment, which is also later discovered.  Under Tinker’s current understanding, the 
first student’s comments are protected by the First Amendment, while the second 
                                                          
 10 Layshock, 593 F.3d at 263 (holding that Layshock’s suspension violated his right of free 
speech); Snyder, 593 F.3d at 303 (holding that Snyder’s suspension did not violate her right of 
free speech).  
 11 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 12 Id. at 513.  
 13 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007) (stating that “[t]here is some 
uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts should apply school speech precedents . . 
. .”) (citation omitted); Benjamin T. Bradford, Comment, Is It Really MySpace? Our 
Disjointed History of Public School Discipline for Student Speech Needs a New Test for an 
Online Era, 3 J. MARSHALL L.J. 323, 331 (2010) (arguing that “when the tests outlined in 
[Tinker and its progeny] are extended to student speech occurring at places and times when 
the students are no longer under school supervision, the logic behind each of the tests begins 
to crack, if not completely crumble.”).  
 14 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 
675 (1986).  For an in-depth discussion of both Morse and Fraser, see infra Part II.B-D. 
 15 See, e.g., Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 16 See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 
1027, 1090 (2008). 
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student is subject to disciplinary action by the school.17  Recognizing this absurdity, 
courts themselves understand that the “on-campus” requirement is becoming 
increasingly meaningless: “[a]s technology allows such access, it requires school 
administrators to be more concerned about speech created off campus—which 
almost inevitably leaks onto campus—than they would have in years past.”18  
Therefore, because the current Tinker standard does not adequately take into account 
speech that occurs on the Internet, a re-examination of this standard is necessary.  
Second, courts are unsure of what exactly constitutes a “substantial disruption” 
under Tinker.  In both Snyder and Layshock, the respective school districts argued 
that a substantial disruption occurred since students circulated copies of the parodied 
MySpace profiles and discussed the profiles’ contents during class time, requiring 
administrators and teachers to repeatedly ask students to refrain from discussing the 
profiles at school.19  While the Snyder court found this to be “substantially 
disruptive” under Tinker,20 the Layshock court did not.21  It is clear from Snyder and 
Layshock that courts are confused about the intersection of student free speech 
precedent and the widespread use of the Internet.  Thus, a clarification of this 
standard would not only inform students of their rights on the Internet, but would 
also guide public schools in determining the limits of their disciplinary reach.  
This Note argues that the Tinker standard needs to be reevaluated to encompass 
Internet-related cases both by eliminating the “on-campus” requirement and by 
further defining what constitutes a “substantial disruption.”  The “on-campus” 
requirement should be eliminated for the following reasons: 1) lower federal courts 
already disregard this condition for Internet-related cases; 2) it leads students to 
abuse their First Amendment rights; and 3) this requirement threatens the safety of 
teachers, students, and other school personnel.  Additionally, Tinker’s “substantial 
disruption” prong would be better understood as a factors test.  This ensures that 
schools utilize the same criteria in determining whether a “substantial disruption” 
has occurred, as well as eliminate the need for courts to define ambiguous terms.  
Part II examines the evolution of Supreme Court student speech cases beginning 
with Tinker in 1969 until its most recent decision in 2007: Morse v. Frederick.22  Part 
III proceeds by arguing that Tinker would be more applicable to present-day student 
speech cases if its “on-campus” requirement was eliminated.  Part IV further argues 
that a clarification of Tinker’s “substantial disruption” requirement is necessary both 
to avoid conflicting results on identical facts23 and to ensure that courts use the same 
criteria to determine whether a “substantial disruption” had occurred.  Implementing 
                                                          
 17 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09. 
 18 Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, at *7 n.5 (M.D. 
Pa. Sept. 11, 2008). 
 19 See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 
2010); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 293-94 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 20 Snyder, 593 F.3d at 302. 
 21 See Layshock, 593 F.3d at 258-59 (acknowledging that the school district could not 
satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption test). 
 22 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 23 See Layshock, 593 F.3d at 253; Snyder, 593 F.3d at 293-94. 
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these revisions would ensure that the Tinker standard is better adapted to Internet-
related cases.  
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE TINKER STANDARD 
This Part discusses the evolution of Supreme Court precedent in the area of 
student free speech rights.  The general standard for student speech was first 
articulated in 1969, when the Court decided Tinker v. Des Moines.  The Court has 
since decided three subsequent student speech cases and has offered a new rationale 
for speech regulation in each case.24  In addition to the confusion caused by these 
four rationales, the Court neglected to expand on the specific situations in which 
each standard potentially applies.  Thus, as a result of these four cases, lower courts 
are left to determine which standard, out of the four possible, is germane to a given 
fact pattern with little guidance from the Supreme Court.  As such, this Part attempts 
to distinguish the four Supreme Court cases and determine the situations under 
which each standard applies.  It will ultimately conclude that Tinker is the 
appropriate standard to use for Internet-related cases.  
A.  The Beginning of Student Free Speech Regulation—Tinker v. Des Moines 
The United States Supreme Court had its first opportunity to define the limits of 
student free speech on public school premises in Tinker v. Des Moines.  There, a 
group of high school students desired to voice their opposition to the Vietnam War 
by wearing black armbands to school.25  Several days before the scheduled protest, 
the school adopted a policy that any student wearing an armband to school would 
either be asked to remove it or suspended.26  Despite this policy, three students 
continued with the protest and wore the black armbands to school and, as a result, all 
three were suspended.27  The students sued the school district, challenging the 
constitutionality of their suspensions.28 
The Court began its analysis by acknowledging that neither teachers nor students 
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”29  However, students’ First Amendment rights must be 
determined by looking at the “special characteristics of the school environment.”30  
Thus, students, while they are on school premises, are not necessarily afforded the 
same First Amendment rights as adults.31 
                                                          
 24 See infra Part II.B-D. 
 25 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 506. 
 30 Id. See also id. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that, “[a] State may . . . 
determine that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive 
audience -is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the 
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.”). 
 31 See id. at 506 (stating that the rights of students must be “applied in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment . . . .”). 
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The Court concluded that, despite the limited First Amendment rights given to 
students, public schools are not free to regulate any speech deemed to be 
unpleasant.32  Schools cannot punish students for a particular expression of opinion 
out of a “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
accompan[ies] an unpopular viewpoint.”33  Thus, to uphold a student’s punishment, 
the school must show that the conduct would “materially disrupt[] classwork or 
involve[] substantial disorder or inva[de] . . .  the rights of others . . . .”34  Because 
the school did not present any evidence that the students’ protest either interrupted 
school activities or intruded upon the rights of others, the Court held that their 
suspensions violated their Constitutional rights.35 
B.  Expanding Speech Restrictions—Bethel School District v. Fraser 
Seventeen years after Tinker, the Court re-examined the bounds of student free 
speech in Bethel School District v. Fraser.36  In Fraser, a high school student 
delivered a sexually explicit speech nominating one of his fellow classmates for 
student elective office during a school assembly.37  Fraser delivered the speech 
despite prior warnings given to him by several teachers regarding the potential 
punishments of delivering the speech.38  After characterizing Fraser’s speech as 
“indecent, lewd, and offensive to the modesty and decency of many of the students 
and faculty in attendance at the assembly,” the school suspended Fraser for three 
days.39  Fraser then sued the school district challenging the constitutionality of his 
suspension.40 
The Court began its analysis with an examination of public schools’ role in 
society.41  The objective of public education is to instill the “fundamental values 
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system” in its students.42  
These fundamental values must teach students to balance an advocacy for unpopular 
and controversial viewpoints with the knowledge of the boundaries of socially 
appropriate behavior.43  Based on these values, the Fraser Court, following Tinker’s 
guidance, acknowledged that “the constitutional rights of students in public school[s] 
are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”44  For 
                                                          
 32 See id. at 509.  
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 513. 
 35 Id. at 514. 
 36 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 37 Id. at 677. 
 38 Id. at 677-78. 
 39 Id. at 678-79. 
 40 Id. at 679. 
 41 Id. at 681. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 682. 
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this reason, “[t]he determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in 
school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.”45  This duty 
is exclusively given to the schools because it is through the conduct of teachers and 
older students that the remainder of the student body understands the appropriate 
form of civil disclosure and expression.46 
Against this backdrop, the Court held that a student’s right of free speech does 
not extend to “vulgar and lewd” speech; so the school district was within its 
authority to discipline Fraser.47  This holding is an exception to Tinker because the 
school does not have to anticipate a disruption of class time or an interference with 
the rights of others.48  Instead, the vulgar and offensive nature of the speech itself is 
sufficient to satisfy the Fraser standard.49  As such, Fraser creates a two-pronged 
analytical framework.  If the student speech is vulgar, then the school is free to 
discipline the student speaker, regardless of the speech’s disruptive nature.  
Conversely, if speech is not vulgar, Tinker remains the applicable authority.   
C.  Further Expansion of Tinker—Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
Two years after Fraser, the Supreme Court again addressed the contours of a 
student’s right to free speech in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.50  
Kuhlmeier involved several students who wrote and edited the school newspaper.51  
The newspaper printed more than 4,500 copies throughout the year and was 
distributed every three weeks to students, school personnel, and other members of 
the community.52  
The paper’s final edition included two controversial articles: one relating several 
students’ experience with teen pregnancy and another discussing the impact of 
divorce on one student and her family.53  Before approving the edition, the principal 
concluded that, despite the authors’ best efforts, the students interviewed for the teen 
pregnancy article would not remain anonymous and that the article on divorce would 
not be a fair representation of both parents involved.54  As a result, the principal 
determined that his only option was to eliminate the two controversial articles.55  The 
                                                          
 45 Id. at 683 (emphasis added). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 685. 
 48  See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (stating that “Fraser established that 
the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute” because the Court did not conduct a 
“substantial disruption” analysis). 
 49 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. 
 50 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 51 Id. at 262. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 263. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 264. 
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students saw this deletion as a violation of their First Amendment rights and sued the 
school district.56 
Similar to the previous cases, the Kuhlmeier Court began by recognizing that 
public schools are not akin to other traditional forums that are used “for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.”57  Therefore, the rights afforded to students in public schools are not 
coextensive with the rights of adults in traditional circumstances.58  Although the 
Kuhlmeier Court began its analysis in a similar manner as both Tinker and Fraser, it 
distinguished itself from both cases and ultimately created a new standard under 
which student speech may be regulated.  
First, the Court stated that “the question . . . addressed in Tinker . . . is different 
from the question” addressed in Kulhmeier, which determined “whether the First 
Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech.”59  
Accordingly, the Kulhmeier Court concluded that “the standard articulated in Tinker 
for determining when a school may punish student expression need not also be the 
standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to 
the dissemination of student expression.”60  Therefore, the Tinker standard was not 
applicable in Kuhlmeier.  
Second, the Kuhlmeier Court stated that “school[s] must be able to take into 
account the emotional maturity of the intended audience in determining whether to 
disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive topics . . . .”61  This takes 
Kuhlmeier out of the realm of the lewd and vulgar speech standard articulated in 
Fraser and instead puts it in a new category of sensitive student speech.  Thus, the 
standard articulated in Kuhlmeier allows a school to exercise “editorial control over 
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so 
long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”62  
Therefore, the students’ First Amendment rights were not violated when the 
principal deleted the two controversial articles.63 
D.  The Final Clarification of Student Speech Restriction—Morse v. Frederick 
The Supreme Court’s most recent examination of student speech rights came in 
2007 when the Court decided Morse v. Frederick.  Morse involved a high school 
student who, in an attempt to get on television at a school-sanctioned, school-
sponsored event, unfurled a large banner that indiscreetly advocated illegal drug 
use.64  The student was told to take down the banner and, upon his refusal, was 
                                                          
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 267 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 469, 515 (1939)). 
 58 Id. at 266 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) & Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
 59 Id. at 270-71. 
 60 Id. at 272-73 (emphasis added). 
 61 Id. at 272. 
 62 Id. at 273. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007). 
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suspended for ten days.65  Frederick sued the school district, alleging that his 
suspension violated his First Amendment right of free speech.66 
The Morse Court distinguished its facts from both Tinker and Fraser, ultimately 
concluding that neither standard was applicable.67  Although Tinker warned that 
schools cannot punish students out of an “‘undifferentiated fear or apprehension of 
[a] disturbance’ or ‘a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that 
always accompan[ies] an unpopular viewpoint,’” the type of speech involved in 
Morse was much more serious.68  A public school’s concern for drug abuse 
prevention extends well beyond a mere desire to avoid and discomfort and 
unpleasantness of a student’s particular viewpoint,69 thus removing this case from a 
Tinker analysis.  Furthermore, although the school district urged the Court to adopt a 
broader reading of Fraser to include Frederick’s drug reference as “offensive” 
speech, such an expansion would allow the standard to encompass virtually all 
speech, as “much political and religious speech might be perceived as offensive to 
some.”70 
Avoiding the Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier standards, the Morse Court upheld 
Frederick’s suspension by reflecting on the dangerous intersection between schools 
and drugs.71  The Court noted that nearly half of American high school students have 
used an illicit drug upon their graduation and 25% of all high school students have 
been “offered, sold, or given an illegal drug on school property within the past 
year.”72  Furthermore, “Congress has declared that part of a school’s job is educating 
students about the dangers of illegal drug use” and has provided schools with 
billions of dollars to support drug-prevention programs.73  As such, the Morse Court 
determined that “[t]he First Amendment does not require schools to tolerate at 
school events student expression that contributes” to the dangers presented by 
drugs.74  Thus, “a public school may prohibit speech advocating illegal drug use.”75 
While the Morse standard seems limited and exclusive to drug use alone, its 
analysis opens an avenue that could allow for its application in a variety of student 
free speech cases.76  The Morse Court did not use an elemental approach, as the 
                                                          
 65 Id. at 396, 398. 
 66 Id. at 399. 
 67 Id. at 408-09. 
 68 Id. at 408 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 
(1969)). 
 69 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 408-09. 
 70 Id. at 409. 
 71 Id. at 407-08. 
 72 Id. at 407 (citation omitted). 
 73 Id. at 408. 
 74 Id. at 410.  
 75 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 76 But cf. id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) (limiting Morse’s holding to student speech that 
reasonably advocates illegal drug use). 
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Tinker Court did,77 but instead appealed to the governmental interest behind drug-
abuse prevention to find that such speech cannot be tolerated in schools.78  Thus, it is 
possible that other forms of student speech may be regulated under the Morse 
analysis based on the importance of a prevailing governmental interest.  However, 
absent further clarification from the Supreme Court, prevailing governmental 
interests only serve as an exception to Tinker’s general standard.  
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to address student Internet speech when it 
decided Morse in 2007.  Instead, the Morse Court created a new rationale for 
regulating student speech without clarifying previous Supreme Court standards.  
Therefore, although lower courts continue to use Tinker as the default authority for 
Internet-related cases,79 Morse’s silence on Internet speech has left both schools and 
courts with a muddled and confusing doctrine.80  As such, lower courts are left to 
decipher the four student speech standards with minimal guidance and clarification 
from the Supreme Court.  In light of this confusion, the Supreme Court needs to re-
examine the Tinker standard and 1) eliminate the “on-campus” requirement to 
incorporate Internet speech and 2) further clarify what constitutes a “substantial 
disruption.” 
III.  TINKER’S “ON-CAMPUS” REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE ELIMINATED 
To better adapt Tinker’s standard for student speech restriction to the Internet era, 
its “on-campus” requirement should be eliminated.  Central to this argument is an 
appreciation for the dependence students now have on the Internet.81  Because the 
Internet is another medium of communication for students, many conversations that 
would have once been private are now available for viewing by a large public 
audience.  Furthermore, public schools are in the difficult position of encouraging 
student Internet use during structured class time on the one hand and discouraging 
personal Internet use during that time on the other hand.82  Using these competing 
                                                          
 77 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) 
(establishing a 2-prong analysis in student speech cases). 
 78 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 408 (stating that “the governmental interest in stopping student 
drug abuse,” reflected in both congressional and school policies, “allow[s] schools to restrict 
student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”). 
 79 See, e.g., Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“[T]he standard for reviewing the suppression of vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive 
speech is governed by Fraser, school-sponsored speech by Hazelwood, and all other speech 
by Tinker.”) (internal citations omitted).  Although these standards do not explicitly mention 
Internet-originated speech, courts have regularly applied the Tinker standard for such cases.  
See, e.g., Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 298 (3d Cir. 2010); Mahaffey ex 
rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Beussink ex rel. 
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998).  While it 
can be argued that Fraser’s standard for lewd and vulgar speech is more appropriate for 
Internet speech, this argument is not addressed in this Note.  Rather, this Note proceeds by 
using Tinker as the general standard for student speech cases because of its continued 
application.  
 80 Benjamin F. Heidlage, Note, A Relational Approach to Schools’ Regulation of Youth 
Online Speech, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 572, 579 (2009). 
 81 See infra Part III.A. 
 82 See infra Part III.B. 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss4/11
2011] TWEAKING TINKER 783 
 
interests as background, this Part will then argue for the elimination of Tinker’s “on-
campus” requirement.   
A.  The Internet’s Influence on Students 
To understand why Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement should be eliminated, it is 
first necessary to appreciate the impact that the Internet has on the lives of most 
modern students.  For students, the Internet is not a detached “virtual world” from 
which they can log on and off at-will; instead, it represents a means of 
communication that is an integral part of their lives.83  Unlike many adults who 
approach their Internet communications as separate from the rest of their actions, 
“most youths, having grown up with such technology, have completely integrated 
the Internet into their everyday interactions.”84  As a result, “for children, there is no 
such dichotomy of online and off-line, or virtual and real—the digital is so much 
intertwined into their lives and psyche that the one is entirely enmeshed with the 
other.”85  Thus, “[t]here is no real separation between the way youths approach 
interactions through traditional methods of communication (including face-to-face) 
and those that occur through Internet technology.”86  
The rise in popularity of social networking sites such as Facebook have 
contributed to this changing method of youth interaction.  Although many adults see 
social networking sites as a means of communication with friends and family, 
students utilize these sites as replacements for “offline social hangouts.”87  
“[T]eenagers [now] hang out on the Internet and their mobile phones just like ‘they 
used to hang out on street corners before.’”88  As a consequence, many conversations 
that would have typically been private between the involved individuals are now 
posted online to be viewed by virtually limitless amounts of people.89  
Consider the following example.  Student complaints about teachers and faculty 
members are certainly not a new phenomenon in public schools.90  However, the rise 
in popularity of the Internet has allowed a greater amount of people to see these once 
private communications, including parents, teachers, and school administrators.91  In 
                                                          
 83 See Heidlage, supra note 80, at 588 (“Youths do not merely approach the Internet as a 
realm that is separate and distinct from the rest of their lives.”). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 588-89 (quoting ANGELA THOMAS, YOUTH ONLINE: IDENTITY AND LITERACY IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE 163 (2007)); see also id. at 580 (“Childrens’ lives in online communities 
connect to and blend into their lives in offline communities: socially, emotionally, sometimes 
physically, and intellectually.”).  
 86 Heidlage, supra note 80, at 589. 
 87 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 
1033-34 (2008). 
 88 Id. at 1034 (internal quotation omitted).  
 89 See id. at 1036-37; Heidlage, supra note 80, at 589 (“What once would have been a 
message passed from one person to another is now an Internet posting available to a 
worldwide audience.”). 
 90 Papandrea, supra note 87, at 1037. 
 91 Id. 
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Wisniewski v. Board of Education,92 an eighth grade student expressed his 
dissatisfaction with one of his teachers by creating an “icon”93 of his teacher on an 
online instant messaging service.94  Wisniewski’s icon “was a small drawing of a 
pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head, above which were dots representing 
splattered blood.  Beneath the drawing appeared the words, ‘Kill Mr. 
VanderMolen.’”95  Although Wisniewski saw this as merely a joke, the school took 
his icon seriously and suspended him for threatening a teacher.96  
As Wisniewski illustrates, student Internet speech typically amplifies what would 
ordinarily be said within the context of a face-to-face conversation.  Likely, if 
Wisniewski had simply complained to his friend about his teacher outside of class, 
the school would have no justifiable cause to suspend him.97  However, because he 
supplemented his complaints with a threatening icon, viewable for three weeks and 
seen by many of his classmates, it was eventually brought to the school’s attention 
and he was suspended.98  
Like Wisniewski, many middle- and high school students perceive little, if any, 
risk in making outrageous and threatening comments online because of the perceived 
anonymity and impunity that the Internet provides.99  “Thus, [students] proceed in 
                                                          
 92 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 93 The AOL instant messaging (IM) service 
permits the sender of IM messages to display on the computer screen an icon, created 
by the sender, which serves as an identifier of the sender, in addition to the sender’s 
name.  The IM icon of the sender and that of the person replying remain on the screen 
during the exchange of text messages between the two “buddies,” and each can copy 
the icon of the other and transmit it to any other “buddy” during an IM exchange. 
Id. at 35-36.  
 94 Id. at 35.  
 95 Id. at 36. 
 96 Id. at 36-37.  
 97 See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (acknowledging that the First 
Amendment gives students the right to “wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket,” 
which stated “Fuck the Draft”); Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that, “[i]f [Fraser] 
had given the same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been 
penalized simply because government officials considered his language to be inappropriate.”) 
(citation omitted).  
 98 Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36. 
 99 Jay Braiman, Note, A New Case, An Old Problem, A Teacher’s Perspective, 74 BROOK. 
L. REV. 439, 471 (2009). See, e.g., Donovan v. Richie, 68 F.3d 14, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(students created a website entitled “The Shit List” which “zeroed in on some 140 named 
students, each name being followed by one or more lines of crude descriptions of character 
and/or behavior . . . [which] were not merely insulting as to appearance, but suggestive, often 
explicitly so, of sexual capacity, proclivity, and promiscuity.”); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. 
Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781-82 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (student created a website entitled 
“Satan’s web page” which included “SATAN’S MISSION FOR YOU THIS WEEK: Stab 
someone for no reason then set them on fire throw them off of a cliff, watch them suffer and 
with their last breath, just before everything goes black, spit on their face.”); J.S. ex rel. H.S. 
& I.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 416 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (the student-
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disseminating their thoughts to anyone and everyone with a connection to this 
seemingly limitless forum for intellectual and linguistic detritus.”100  Since both 
courts and schools are unsure of how far a student’s right of free speech extends, 
students continue to push the boundaries and gain control of the classroom.101   
B.  The Difficulties Schools Face in Enforcing Limits on the Internet 
The freedom and invincibility students often feel while communicating online 
certainly places public schools in a difficult position.  On one hand, public schools 
encourage student Internet use by providing on-campus computer labs equipped with 
the Internet, requiring research to be done online, and by instructing students on how 
to use the Internet.  By encouraging student Internet use, schools hope to ensure that 
students both have access to technology and an understanding of how to 
appropriately use it.102  
To further encourage students’ technological proficiency, schools across the 
country are changing the face of classroom note-taking by providing students with 
in-class computers and iPads, making traditional notebooks and pens obsolete.103  
Teachers and administrators believe that, through the widespread use of technology 
in classrooms, students will become more interested and engaged in the material.104  
However, by readily providing students with Internet access, schools risk the 
possibility that it will be used for the students’ own personal use during school 
hours, rather than just school-related material.105  In Beussink v. Woodland,106 
students were able to access a classmate’s offensive homepage from computers in 
both the school’s computer lab and library.107  Interestingly, based on the attention 
                                                          
created website depicted his teacher “with her head cut off and blood dripping from her neck,” 
and included a donation section to pay for a hitman for the teacher). 
 100 Braiman, supra note 99, at 471.  See also id. at 474 (stating that “[t]he Internet seems to 
have given children and adolescents, who lack the judgment and foresight to fully appreciate 
the consequences of their words and actions, a forum to say whatever they please, protected 
further from those consequences by the perceived, if illusory, safety and absence of risk 
provided by the Internet’s abstract distance and anonymity.”).  
 101 See id. at 472-74. 
 102 Antrenise Cole, Grant Secures iPads for Attalla Schools, GADSDEN TIMES (Gadsden, 
Ala.), Sept. 22, 2010, available at 
http://www.gadsdentimes.com/article/20100922/NEWS/100929956/1016/NEWS?p=1&tc=pg 
(stating that “[i]t’s our job to make sure students have access to . . . technology and know what 
they’re supposed to do with it.”). 
 103 See, e.g., id.; Jill Russell, iPads for All, THE DAILY NEWS ONLINE (Longview, Wash.), 
Sept. 18, 2010, available at http://tdn.com/news/local/article_ecb836ee-c3ae-11df-83af-
001cc4c03286.html.  
 104 Cole, supra note 102. 
 105 See Russell, supra note 103.  Certainly students have access to the Internet through 
means other than school-provided computers, such as cell phones and personal computers.  
However, the technology dilemma for schools arises when Internet-accessible computers are 
directly provided to students from the school itself.   
 106 Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 
1998).  
 107 Id. at 1178-79.  
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generated by the website, the school’s computer teacher granted several students 
permission to access the website from the school’s computers during class time.108 
While Beussink presents a unique situation in which a teacher actively promoted 
the use of personal Internet sites during school hours, teachers and administrators are 
often unaware that students are using the available technology for personal use.109  
For example, in Layshock, students used the school-provided computers available in 
their Spanish classroom and in other parts of the school to access the parody 
MySpace page.110  However, administrators only discovered that students were 
accessing MySpace from on-campus computers after an investigation in the weeks 
following the website’s creation.111  Even after the school learned of students’ 
MySpace access during school hours, students remained able to access the website, 
despite the technology director’s “best efforts” to prevent it.112 
Thus, schools are faced with two competing interests: keeping students up-to-
date and skilled in technological advancements on one hand and maintaining control 
and discipline in their classrooms on the other.  Further complicating this issue are 
the uncertainties schools face regarding the bounds of their disciplinary authority 
over student Internet speech.113  Although public schools are required to “inculcat[e 
in their students the] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a 
democratic political system,”114 the widespread use of technology is making this 
increasingly difficult.115 
C.  Arguments for the Elimination of Tinker’s “On-Campus” Requirement 
Schools’ competing technological interests coupled with student Internet 
dependence indicate that Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement serves no functional 
purpose within the confines of today’s Internet-dependent schools.  As such, this 
requirement should be eliminated.  There are three prominent reasons behind the 
conclusion.  First, federal courts across the country have disregarded the “on-
campus” requirement based on the nature of Internet speech.116  Second, students 
continue to push the boundaries of decency within the school environment by 
                                                          
 108 Id. at 1179. 
 109 See, e.g., Layshock ex rel. v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(stating that “[s]chool district administrators were unaware of Justin’s in-school attempts to 
access MySpace until their investigation the following week.”).  
 110 See id. (stating that “ [o]n December 15, Justin used a computer in his Spanish 
classroom to access his MySpace profile . . . [and] Justin again attempted to access the profile 
from school on December 16 . . . .”). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 See supra note 10.  
 114 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986). 
 115 See Braiman, supra note 99, at 459 n. 129 (describing a student’s disregard of her 
teacher’s requests to put her cell phone away during class time). 
 116 See discussion infra Part III.C.1.  See also Papandrea, supra note 87, at 1090 (stating 
that the nature of the Internet makes it “generally nowhere and everywhere at the same time . . 
. .”). 
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harassing, degrading, humiliating, and slandering their teachers, administrators, and 
fellow classmates over the Internet.117  Based on this intensified student speech, the 
continued application of the “on-campus” requirement encourages students to abuse 
their First Amendment rights.118  Third, Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement should be 
eliminated because of the dangers posed by its continued use.119   
1.  Federal Courts Disregard the “On-Campus” Requirement for Internet-Related 
Cases 
Federal courts have long understood Tinker as requiring non-protected speech to 
originate “on-campus”120—thus anything that happens outside of the reasonable 
bounds of the school is protected under the First Amendment.  However, the express 
language of the Tinker decision allows a school to punish student conduct that 
occurs either “in class or out of it,” so long as it substantially disrupts classwork.121  
Thus, although Tinker is understood to require “on-campus” origination, its express 
language allows courts to disregard this requirement and schools to extend their 
disciplinary authority past the school boundaries.  
Only seven years after Tinker was decided, lower federal courts began to relax 
the “on-campus” requirement. In Fenton v. Stear,122 a group of high school students 
were gathered at a public shopping center away from school on a Sunday 
afternoon.123  The group noticed one of their teachers passing by and one student 
commented, loud enough for the teacher to hear, “he’s a prick.”124  The student who 
made the comment was suspended for three days.125  Although the speech occurred 
off-campus and outside of regular school hours, the court upheld the suspension 
holding that “[i]t is our opinion that when a high school student refers to a high 
school teacher in a public place on a Sunday by a lewd and obscene name in such a 
loud voice that the teacher and others hear the insult it may be deemed a matter for 
discipline in the discretion of school authorities.”126 
Although this case was not decided under the Tinker standard, its holding shows 
the beginning of a rift between Tinker and lower court decisions that is especially 
                                                          
 117 See supra note 99.  
 118 See discussion infra Part III.C.2. 
 119 See discussion infra Part III.C.3. 
 120 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (stating that “[i]n school, 
however, [students’] First Amendment rights [are] circumscribed in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment.”) (internal quotations omitted); Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (allowing student speech restrictions if the 
speech occurs “in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized 
hours.”) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 
(1969)). 
 121 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
 122 Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1976). 
 123 Id. at 769. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 772. 
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significant for Internet-related cases.127  The Fenton court reasoned that the 
protections afforded under the First Amendment do not extend to insulting or 
fighting words which “incite an immediate breach of the peace.”128  Additionally, 
“[t]o countenance such student conduct even in a public place without imposing 
sanctions could lead to devastating consequences in the school.”129  Recently, several 
courts presented with Internet-centered cases have recognized the danger feared in 
Fenton and, as a result, have relaxed Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement.  
In J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District,130 an eighth grade student made a 
personal website entitled “Teacher Sux” which included insulting and degrading 
comments about this teacher as well as a solicitation of $20 from every visitor to 
“help pay for the hitman.”131  The student was subsequently suspended after the 
targeted teacher, as well as the school community, discovered the website.132  
Relying on previous federal decisions, the Bethlehem court had little trouble 
concluding that “courts have allowed school officials to discipline students for 
conduct occurring off of school premises where it is established that the conduct 
materially and substantially interferes with the educational process.”133 
Continuing the trend set in Bethlehem, the Wisniewski court gave little weight to 
the website’s off-campus creation.134  While Wisniewski argued that his website’s 
off-campus origination barred him from punishment, the court instead determined 
that its place of origin “does not necessarily insulate him from school discipline.”135  
                                                          
 127 Following the Fenton decision, several non-Internet related cases continued the break 
from Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement.  In Donovan v. Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14, 15-16 (1st Cir. 
1995), a group of students created “The Shit List” which “zeroed in on some 140 named 
students, each name being followed by one or more lines of crude descriptions of character 
and/or behavior.”  While the list was neither made nor distributed on school premises, copies 
were placed in the school’s garbage can and called to school officials’ attention.  Id. at 16.  
The court concluded that the off-campus conduct led to the distribution of the list on school 
premises, therefore the students’ suspensions were upheld.  J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem 
Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 419 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (discussing the Donovan 
decision). 
 128 Fenton, 423 F. Supp. at 771. 
 129 Id. at 772. 
 130 Bethlehem, 757 A.2d 412. 
 131 Id. at 416.  Directed at a particular teacher, the website stated, “Fuck you Mrs. Fulmer.  
You are a Bitch.  You are a Stupid Bitch” and included a “diagram of Mrs. Fulmer with her 
head cut off and blood dripping from her neck.”  Id. 
 132 Id. at 417.  The district court found that the effect the website had on the school 
community “was comparable to the effect . . . [of] the death of a student or staff member 
because there was a feeling of helplessness and a plummeting morale.”  Id.  
 133 Id. at 421.  
 134 Relying in part on the Bethlehem decision, the court in Wisniewski similarly stated that 
“[w]e have recognized that off-campus conduct can create a foreseeable risk of substantial 
disruption within a school.”  Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 
494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 
 135 Id.  See also id. at 39 n.3 (stating that since Morse, the Supreme Court has not 
determined the circumstances under which a school may discipline students for off-campus 
activities). 
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Thus, relying on previous decisions, the Wisniewski court concluded that if off-
campus conduct creates a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption, the punishment 
will be upheld.136  
Although some courts are more reserved about expanding Tinker’s authority to 
off-campus speech,137 a substantial number of courts have little trouble extending 
both Tinker and the school’s authority, so long as a substantial threat of disruption 
exists.138  These decisions indicate a growing recognition by courts that Tinker’s “on-
campus” requirement is unworkable in an Internet-reliant society.139  Furthermore, 
heavy reliance on the on- / off-campus distinction overlooks the thrust of Tinker, 
which is not as concerned with the origin of the speech as it is with the disruption it 
causes within the school.140  For these reasons, the Tinker standard would be better 
adapted to Internet-related cases if its “on-campus” requirement was eliminated.  
2.  Retention of the “On-Campus” Requirement Leads to Abuse of Students’ First 
Amendment Rights 
Dissenting from the Tinker majority, Justice Black warned that “[t]urned loose 
with lawsuits for damages and injunctions against their teachers . . . it is nothing but 
wishful thinking to imagine that young, immature students will not soon believe it is 
their right to control the schools . . . .”141  It is easy to see how Justice Black’s fears 
                                                          
 136 Id. at 39. 
 137 See, e.g., Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir. 
2010); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2002).  It 
should be noted that much confusion surrounds the application of the “on-campus 
requirement.”  For example, some courts implicitly determine that the “on-campus” 
requirement must be satisfied when the speech originates.  See Layshock, 593 F.3d at 259.  
Therefore, if the speech does not originate on school grounds, the “on-campus” requirement 
has not been satisfied, regardless of the speech eventual entrance “on-campus.”  However, in 
Thomas ex rel. Tiedeman v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist, 607 F.2d 1043, 1045-46 
(2d Cir. 1979), a group of students were suspended for creating and distributing a satirical 
newspaper.  The Second Circuit deemed their punishments unconstitutional because the 
newspaper neither originated nor was distributed on school premises.  Id. at 1050.  Unlike 
Layshock, the Thomas decision states that Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement can be satisfied 
either if 1) the speech originates on school grounds, or 2) if the speech eventually crosses onto 
school boundaries.  Therefore, as these cases indicate, it is unclear whether the speech needs 
to simply originate off-campus to be protected or whether it needs to be seen or heard off-
campus, as well. 
 138 See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 298 (3d Cir. 
2010); Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39; Bethlehem, 757 A.2d at 421.  
 139 See Matthew I. Schiffhauer, Note, Uncertainty at the “Outer Boundaries” of the First 
Amendment: Extending the Arm of School Authority beyond the Schoolhouse Gate into 
Cyberspace, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 731, 756-58 (2010).  
 140 See Schiffhauer, supra note 139, at 757; Stephanie Klupinski, Note, Getting Past the 
Schoolhouse Gate: Rethinking Student Speech in the Digital Era, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 643-
44 (2010); see also Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist., 467 F.3d 755, 768 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating 
that “[t]he Tinker rule is a ‘flexible one,’ and in applying it, ‘we look to the totality of the 
relevant facts,’ including not only the plaintiffs’ actions, but ‘all of the circumstances 
confronting the school officials’ at the time.”) (citations omitted).  
 141 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 525 (1969) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
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have become a reality in present-day public schools.  With minimal computer 
knowledge, students can create humiliating profiles of their principals,142 threaten the 
lives of their teachers and fellow classmates,143 and use sexually graphic language to 
describe virtually any member of the school community with whom they have had 
contact.144  Moreover, all of this can be accomplished while hiding behind the First 
Amendment right of free speech.  Because some courts continue to protect this 
degrading, humiliating, and threatening speech under the First Amendment, students 
are experiencing unprecedented authority in the classroom, believing that anything 
they say on the Internet is protected.145  To restore both the educational mission of 
public schools as well as the safety felt by teachers and students, it is necessary to 
eliminate Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement.  
Central to Fraser was the Court’s recognition that “public education must 
prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic” by “inculcat[ing] fundamental values 
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.”146  These 
fundamental values must include tolerance of opposing viewpoints, as well as a 
respect for the sensibilities of others.147  To instill these values in its students, public 
schools are required to “[balance] unpopular and controversial views . . . against the 
society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially 
appropriate behavior.”148 
While the role of public schools has not changed since Fraser, a school’s ability 
to ensure that its students are furnished with these fundamental values has become 
infinitely more difficult with the rise of the Internet.  Central to this difficulty is a 
school’s ability to discipline its students.  As Justice Black remarked, “[s]chool 
discipline, like parental discipline, is an integral and important part of training our 
children to be good citizens—to be better citizens.”149  However,  
schoolchildren . . . [who lack] the capacity to appreciate the obligations, 
risks, and consequences that [attach to the right of free speech], become 
empowered to defy school authorities, say and do whatever they please 
                                                          
 142 See, e.g., Layshock, 593 F.3d at 252-53, 254; Snyder, 593 F.3d at 291-92, 295. 
 143 See, e.g.,  Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 
35-37 (2d Cir. 2007); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781-83 
(E.D. Mich. 2002); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 416-17 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2000); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177-80 
(E.D. Mo. 1998). 
 144 See, e.g., Donovan v. Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 145 See Braiman, supra note 99, at 472-74 (claiming that students are presently using the 
First Amendment as a “sword rather than as a shield.”). 
 146 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 524 (1969) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
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while they are in school, and hale teachers and school officials into court 
when they do not get their way.150 
Again, it is not difficult to see that Justice Black’s fears have become a reality in 
many present-day public schools.  In retaliation for being disciplined, students no 
longer simply complain to friends about the action taken against them or about the 
disciplining teacher or principal.  Instead, they charge to the perceived safety and 
anonymity of the Internet151 and accuse the disciplinarian of pedophilia,152 illegal 
drug use,153 and discuss the disciplinarian’s sexual history.154  While perhaps such 
accusations are not new with the rise of the Internet, the extent to which others can 
access them has certainly increased.  These accusations not only undermine the 
integrity and authority of the school, but they also seriously call into question the 
reputation of the singled-out teacher or principal.155 
While proponents of the “on-campus” requirement argue that the disciplinary 
authority for Internet actions should rest solely with the students’ parents, this 
solution cannot realistically inform students of the severity of their actions.  Despite 
parental discipline, students do not appreciate the consequences and implications of 
their actions on the Internet.  In Snyder, despite the student’s extensive punishment 
from her parents, she proceeded to sue her school, alleging violations of her right of 
free speech.156  Thus, despite parental punishment, Snyder did not believe that she 
was at fault for the hurtful and offensive allegations she brought against her 
principal.  Instead, she believed that she was entitled to say whatever she pleased 
about her principal and that the school had violated this constitutionally-protected 
right.  
Furthermore, delegating disciplinary authority solely to parents undermines the 
vital ability of a school to punish students for conduct that is not in line with the 
school’s mission.  “Realistically . . . children could not be educated if school 
officials supervising pre-college students were without power to punish one who” 
disrupted the educational mission of the school.157  As many student speech cases 
                                                          
 150 Braiman, supra note 99, at 458 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524-
26). See also J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 294 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(attributing the rise in lawsuits against schools for violations of student First Amendment 
rights to “a new culture of students rallying against the administration.”). 
 151 See Braiman, supra note 99, at 471 (stating that, “[f]or many students, the Internet 
provides anonymity and, they believe, impunity.”). 
 152 See Snyder, 593 F.3d at 291. 
 153 See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 154 See Snyder, 593 F.3d at 291; J.S ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 
412, 416 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000). 
 155 See, e.g., Layshock, 593 F.3d at 253 (stating that, after the creation of the “‘degrading’, 
‘demeaning’, ‘demoralizing’, and ‘shocking’” website, the principal was “concerned about his 
reputation.”). 
 156 See Snyder, 593 F.3d at 293, 294-95. 
 157 Thomas ex rel. Tiedeman v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist, 607 F.2d 1043, 
1049 (2d Cir. 1979). 
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indicate, the creation of parody Internet sites have a direct impact on the educational 
mission of the school by disrupting class time, undermining the authority of school 
administrators, greatly infringing upon the teachers’ sense of safety and well-being, 
and causing rumors to spread about particular teachers and principals.158  Removing 
any disciplinary authority from the school simply because the Internet writings did 
not occur “on-campus” would drastically undermine the school’s authority.  
Consequently, to paraphrase Justice Black, students would then be empowered to 
believe that they may say what they please, where they please, and when they 
please.159 
Critics of eliminating the “on-campus” requirement further argue that, if schools 
could extend their disciplinary authority onto the Internet, then virtually no student 
expression would be out of the school’s reach.160  However, eliminating the “on-
campus” requirement still ensures that, under Tinker, the Internet speech creates a 
substantial disruption or an interference with the rights of others to fall outside the 
protections of the First Amendment.161  This certainly does not include all Internet 
speech that directly relates to the students’ school, teachers, principals, or fellow 
students,162 but only speech that is deemed substantially disruptive by the school.  
Thus, the school’s disciplinary authority takes effect only once the Internet speech 
threatens to substantially disrupt either school activities or the rights of others.163 
This ensures that school administrators do not take a “knee-jerk” overreaction to 
student expression164 out of a “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompan[ies] an unpopular viewpoint.”165 On the 
                                                          
 158 See, e.g., Layshock, 593 F.3d at 252; Snyder, 593 F.3d at 294; Bethlehem, 757 A.2d at 
417.  
 159 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 522 (1969) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
 160 See Layshock, 593 F.3d at 260 (stating that “[i]t would be an unseemly and dangerous 
precedent to allow the state in the guise of school authorities to reach into a child’s home and 
control his/her actions there to the same extent that they can control that child when he/she 
participates in school sponsored activities.”); Schiffhauer, supra note 139, at 760-61 (arguing 
that punishing students for Internet speech is too invasive and has the potential to do more 
harm to the school community than the Internet speech itself); Papandrea, supra note 87, at 
1091-92 (arguing that the elimination of the “on-campus” requirement would “grant schools 
virtually unbridled discretion to restrict juvenile speech generally.”). 
 161 In Snyder, the majority “disagree[d] with our dissenting colleague’s assertion that under 
our standard a school district could punish two students ‘for using a vulgar remark to speak 
about their teacher at a private party. . . .’  Our opinion, reached by applying Tinker, only 
allows school discipline when there is a significant risk of substantial disruption at the school.  
[Therefore,] there is no risk that a vulgar comment made outside the school environment will 
result in school discipline absent a significant risk of a substantial disruption at the school.”  
593 F.3d at 301 n.8. 
 162 See Papandrea, supra note 87, at 1091-92 (fearing that, because most student expression 
centers around their school, virtually any student expression would come to the school’s 
attention and, thus, be under its disciplinary control). 
 163 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.  
 164 See Schiffhauer, supra note 139, at 761.  
 165 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
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contrary, it allows schools to assess the “special characteristics of the school 
environment” and determine whether punishment is warranted for the disruption 
caused by the Internet speech.166   
Abuse of the First Amendment right of free speech by students may not be a new 
phenomenon, but its effects are certainly farther-reaching and more disruptive with 
the rise of the Internet.  Students’ beliefs that they are entitled to say virtually 
whatever they want on the Internet undermines the educational mission of the 
school, disrupts school activities and class time, harasses teachers and students, and 
contributes to their growing misconception that they control the schools.167  
Retention of Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement reinforces these misconceptions in 
students and allows them to hide behind the First Amendment with the belief that the 
school has violated their right to say whatever they please.  Therefore, Tinker’s “on-
campus” requirement should be eliminated to ensure that students do not abuse their 
First Amendment rights, thus allowing public schools to once again instill in its 
students the fundamental values necessary for entrance into society.168 
3.  Retention of Tinker’s “On-Campus” Requirement Threatens the Safety of 
Teachers, Students, and Other School Personnel 
The incidents of cyber violence and cyberbullying have risen with alarming rates 
over the past decade.169  These “[v]iolent incidents in schools . . . deprive students of 
their constitutionally protected property right to an education because they divert 
students’ attention from their studies [and] create[] an atmosphere of fear and 
apprehension while diminishing the school’s educational mission.”170  Although 
courts certainly do not condone threats of violence, they implicitly allow such 
conduct to occur by prohibiting discipline simply because the threat originates “off-
campus.” 
In Mahaffey v. Aldrich,171 a student created a website entitled “Satan’s web page” 
which included a weekly mission for other students.172  One week, “Satan’s” mission 
instructed the website’s viewers to “[s]tab someone for no reason then set them on 
fire throw them off of a cliff, watch them suffer and with their last breath, just before 
everything goes black, spit on their face.”173  The student then advised viewers that 
“[k]illing people is wrong don’t do [i]t unless Im [sic] there to watch.”174  Despite the 
                                                          
 166 Id. at 506. 
 167 Id. at 525 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 168 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
 169 See generally Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying: Identification, 
Prevention, and Response, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR., 
http://www.cyberbullying.us/Cyberbullying_Identification_Prevention_Response_Fact_Sheet.
pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
 170 Michael C. Jacobson, Note, Chaos in Public Schools: Federal Courts Yield to Students 
While Administrators and Teachers Struggle to Control the Increasingly Violent and 
Disorderly Scholastic Environment, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 909, 936 (2006). 
 171 Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
 172 Id. at 781-82. 
 173 Id. at 782. 
 174 Id. 
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seriousness and dangerous nature of the website, the district court believed that the 
website was created within the student’s First Amendment rights.175  Utilizing a 
dangerous line of reasoning, the court downplayed the threats written on the website 
and instead saw it as a simply a joke that was created for laughs.176  Furthermore, the 
court gave great weight to the website’s disclaimer, telling viewers, “NOW THAT 
YOU’VE READ MY WEB PAGE PLEASE DON’T GO KILLING PEOPLE AND 
STUFF THEN BLAMING IT ON ME. OK?”177  Based on these two factors, the 
court determined that a reasonable person would interpret the website as a joke 
which did not actually intend for anyone to be harmed or killed.178 
Perhaps even more disturbing is the court’s utter disregard of previous acts of 
violence based on Internet writings.  Included on “Satan’s web page” was an 
introduction stating, “[t]his site has no purpose.  It is here to say what is cool, and 
what sucks.  For example, Music is cool.  School sucks.  If you are reading this you 
probably know me and Think Im [sic] evil, sick and twisted.”179  It went on to “list[] 
‘people I wish would die,’ ‘people that are cool,’ ‘movies that rock,’ ‘music I hate,’ 
and ‘music that is cool.’”180  Eerily similar to this website were the writings created 
by Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the students responsible for the Columbine 
Massacre.  Harris’ and Klebold’s writings, like Mahaffey’s website, stated, “You 
know what I hate?  Star Wars fans: get a friggin life, you boring geeks.  You know 
what I hate?  People who mispronounce words . . . . You know what I hate?  People 
who drive slow in the fast lane, God these people do not know how to drive.  You 
know what I hate?  The WB network!!!!”181 
Critics of eliminating the “on-campus” requirement argue that societal changes 
have caused students to express themselves in a violent and crude manner and 
courts, who cannot appreciate such changes, overreact to “nonsense or ‘sick 
humor.’”182  However, this can hardly be deemed a legitimate reason for retaining 
Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement.  Although it is admittedly difficult for schools to 
predict whether a student’s Internet threats have the potential to be carried out, 
schools cannot wait until a threat is actually carried out to consider disciplinary 
action to protect the safety of the school community.183  Adhering to the Mahaffey 
line of reasoning would ensure that the school could take no disciplinary action 
could until after a particular threat is carried out. 
                                                          
 175 Id. at 786. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. at 781-82. 
 180 Id. at 782. 
 181 Jacobson, supra note 170, at 935 (citation omitted). 
 182 Schiffhauer, supra note 139, at 759. 
 183 See Rob Quinn, 3 Teens on Facebook Hit List Killed, NEWSER (Aug. 25, 2010, 1:43 
AM), http://www.newser.com/story/98904/3-teens-on-facebook-hit-list-killed.html.  Under 
facts strikingly similar to many cases mentioned throughout this Note, a hit list was posted on 
Facebook, naming 100 men and women who were to be killed if they did not evacuate town.  
Id.  Police “initially thought [the site] was a joke[;]” however three of the named individuals 
were shot and killed.  Id.  
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Furthermore, threatening Internet speech is undoubtedly seen by many of the 
student’s classmates, thus disturbing the aura of safety within the confines of the 
school community.  Although courts disregard threatening websites as jokes that 
could not possibly be taken seriously,184 the individuals against whom the threats are 
made certainly do not interpret the websites as students simply looking for laughs.185  
If schools are to continue protecting the safety and well-being of all school 
personnel, Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement cannot be sustained.  
“The original idea of schools . . . was that children had not yet reached the point 
of experience and wisdom which enabled them to teach all of their elders.”186  
Although this idea has not changed since Tinker was handed down in 1969, retention 
of its “on-campus” requirement allows students to out-smart their elders by writing 
harassing, degrading, humiliating, and threatening messages on the Internet under 
the perceived protection of the First Amendment.  Federal courts across the country 
are recognizing the counter-intuition of this requirement and allow school 
disciplinary action for things said online.187  “Change has been said to be truly the 
law of life but sometimes the old and the tried and true are worth holding.”188  
However, when the tried and true no longer serve a useful purpose in the law, the 
only beneficial solution is change, which, in this case, is the elimination of Tinker’s 
“on-campus” requirement. 
IV.  TINKER’S SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION TEST SHOULD BE BETTER DEFINED 
In addition to eliminating the “on-campus” requirement, the Court should 
provide clarity to Tinker’s “substantial disruption” prong by creating a factors test.  
The Tinker standard allows a public school to punish its students so long as the 
speech “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of 
the rights of others . . . .”189  Although this standard has been applied to countless 
cases since its 1969 inception,190 no court has given “substantial disruption” a precise 
definition.  While most courts uniformly agree that Tinker grants deference to the 
school’s finding of a substantial disruption,191 courts are unsure of what exactly 
                                                          
 184 See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 36 
(2d Cir. 2007); Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 786; J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. 
Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 421 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000). 
 185 See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36 (stating that the threatened teacher asked to be removed 
from the student’s English class, out of both fear and embarrassment); Bethlehem, 757 A.2d at 
416-17 (stating that the threatened teacher received a medical sabbatical leave of absence for 
the school year and could not mingle with crowds out of fear that someone was intending to 
kill her). 
 186 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 522 (1969) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
 187 See discussion supra Part III.C.1. 
 188 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 189 Id. at 513. 
 190 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 137. 
 191 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (stating that the “school . . . must be able to show that its 
action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompan[ies] an unpopular viewpoint.”) (emphasis added); 
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constitutes a “substantial disruption.”  Therefore, to create a more understandable 
and unified standard, courts should adopt a factors test to determine if a “substantial 
disruption” has occurred. 
Although countless court opinions have utilized the Tinker analysis, no court has 
given an exact definition to a “substantial disruption.”  It is precisely this absence 
that accounted for the conflicting opinions in Snyder and Layshock.  In both cases, 
students circulated copies of the parodied MySpace profiles and spoke about the 
profiles’ contents during class time, requiring administrators and teachers to 
repeatedly ask students to refrain from discussing the profiles at school.192  The 
Snyder court was satisfied that such disruptions were “substantial” enough under 
Tinker193 while the Layshock court was not.194  Based on the conflicting results of 
these almost identical cases, it is clear that a more defined standard is required. 
Although there is no precise definition of a “substantial disruption,” the court in 
Saxe v. State College Area School District195 stated that, “[t]he primary function of a 
public school is to educate its students; [therefore] conduct that substantially 
interferes with the mission is, almost by definition, disruptive to the school 
environment.”196  However, this circular definition gives courts little assistance in 
determining if a student’s First Amendment rights have been violated.  Furthermore, 
this seems contrary to what the Tinker Court itself implied—that a “substantial 
disruption” must have a physical interference in the school.197 
Under Justice Fortas’ reasoning in Tinker, a “substantial disruption” occurs 
when: 1) the student’s speech interferes with, or is likely to interfere with, the 
school’s direct teaching activities; 2) the communication from the teacher to the 
students or from the students back to the teacher is in a structured setting; and 3) 
there is violence or a threat of violence.198  However, this definition provides little 
more guidance than the attempted definition set out in Saxe.  For example, when is a 
                                                          
Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 299 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that, “a school 
may meet its burden of showing a substantial disruption through its well-founded belief that 
future disruption will occur.”  (citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008))); 
Thomas ex rel. Tiedeman v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 
n.13 (2d Cir. 1979) (dismissing an argument that courts, rather than schools, should adopt 
student-speech regulations because of the “oft-articulated deference to the discretion of school 
officials.”) (citations omitted). 
 192 See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 
2010); Snyder, 593 F.3d at 293-94. 
 193 See Snyder, 593 F.3d at 303. 
 194 See Layshock, 593 F.3d at 263. 
 195 Saxe ex rel. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 196 Id. at 217. 
 197 See Abby Marie Mollen, Comment, In Defense of the “Hazardous Freedom” of 
Controversial Student Speech, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1501, 1522 (2008) (arguing that “Justice 
Black’s statement in dissent that the armbands “did divert students’ minds from their regular 
lessons” might suggest that the Tinker Court did not consider nonphysical interference to be 
sufficient.”). 
 198 See Mark Yudof, Tinker Tailored: Good Faith, Civility, and Student Expression, 69 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 365, 367-68 (1995). 
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teacher involved in “direct teaching activities?”  The Snyder court implicitly 
determined that breaking up several minutes worth of conversation during 
unstructured free time constituted a direct teaching activity.199  However, this same 
activity was not considered a direct teaching activity in Layshock.200  
Furthermore, how serious must the threat of violence be to warrant a disruption?  
In Bethlehem, the court determined that the solicitation of money from other students 
to hire a hit man was a serious threat that constituted a “substantial disruption.”201  
However, in Mahaffey, an arguably more dangerous threat of violence was not 
serious enough to be considered a “substantial disruption.”202  It is clear from these 
decisions that the little guidance provided by Tinker has left courts unsure of what 
exactly constitutes a “substantial disruption.”  Therefore, further clarification is 
necessary.  
To allow for both the flexibility and subjectiveness required in a public school 
setting, the best and most effective way to evaluate a “substantial disruption” is 
through a factors test.  Under a factors test, courts do not need a precise definition of 
“direct teaching activities” or the “educational mission” of the school.  Instead, 
courts can evaluate the school’s forecast of a substantial disruption through a 
specified list of elements.  Significant factors should include: 1) the amount of time 
disrupted in the classrooms;203 2) the extent to which the Internet speech was 
directed at a particular member of the school community, including other students, 
teachers, or administrators; 3) the subject matter of the speech, including its level of 
vulgarity and obscenity;204 4) the physical, emotional, professional, and personal 
consequences experienced by the target of the Internet speech; 5) any relevant 
reaction to the speech outside of the school community, including parental concerns 
or the necessity of police involvement; 6) the severity of any threat made against a 
particular member of the school community; and 7) the extent to which a reasonable 
                                                          
 199 See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 294, 303 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 200 See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 253, 263 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 201 See J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 416, 422 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2000). 
 202 See Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781-82, 786 (E.D. 
Mich. 2002). 
 203 This non-exhaustive list can include time spent by teachers quieting students from 
talking about the disputed Internet speech during either structured or unstructured class time, 
conversations between teachers and students about the disputed Internet speech inside the 
classroom, and time spent accessing the disputed Internet speech through school-provided 
computers or the students’ own personal computers and cell phones.  
 204 Although schools cannot punish a student solely out of a “discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompan[ies] an unpopular viewpoint,” Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969), a student’s level of obscenity or vulgarity 
should be a relevant factor in determining whether the speech is protected, see Bethel Sch. 
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986).  It should be noted that the level of obscenity and 
vulgarity could remove a particular student Internet speech from a Tinker analysis and place it 
instead under Fraser’s authority.  However, the exact amount of vulgarity necessary to 
warrant a Fraser analysis can best be determined by the courts.  
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person would dismiss the Internet speech as a mere joke.  Although this list assumes 
equal weight to all factors, both schools and courts can afford more weight to certain 
elements if the circumstances indicate that such imbalance is necessary.  
Opponents of this revised approach can argue that a factors test creates just as 
much, if not more, uncertainty than the current standard because it “fails to provide 
clear, workable guidance for future cases.”205  However, the strength of this 
argument is limited by two beneficial aspects of factors tests.  First, although the 
proposed factors test will require courts to define more terms than the previous 
“substantial disruption” test, it does not follow that this will create more confusion in 
both the courts and schools.  Rather, it will free courts from the burden of 
determining what exactly constitutes a “substantial disruption” and allow them to 
look at a list of factors relevant to determining whether a “substantial disruption” has 
occurred.  Given the confusion that courts endure in determining the existence of a 
“substantial disruption,”206 a factors test will be a beneficial guide, rather than a 
cause of greater confusion.  
Second, factors tests provide courts with enough flexibility to craft their rulings 
to particularized fact patterns.  The “special characteristics of the school 
environment,” as recognized by Justice Fortas, indicate that courts cannot effectively 
apply a single, broad standard to all schools.207  Rather, courts must utilize a standard 
that allows for both the flexibility necessary in a particular school environment and 
consistency required for the faithful application of the law.  The most effective way 
to craft such a standard is through a factors test. 
Because courts have not received sufficient guidance on what constitutes a 
“substantial disruption” from either Tinker or Saxe, further clarification is necessary.  
To avoid contradictory results, the “substantial disruption” prong would be better 
understood and utilized as a factors test. Factor tests ensure that courts: 1) are not left 
to decipher the meaning of ambiguous words on their own and thus reach 
contradictory conclusions208 and 2) utilize the same criteria to determine whether the 
school was justified in punishing the disputed Internet speech.  Therefore, Tinker’s 
“substantial disruption” prong should look at a list of relevant factors, rather than 
one culminating disruption within the school. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As Justice Black opined, “[c]hange has been said to be truly the law of life . . . 
.”209  Therefore, when confronted with an unworkable doctrine, courts must 
recognize the doctrine’s limitations and redefine the standard to fit the changing 
times.  The current Tinker standard for student free speech has created significant 
confusion among lower courts, which has allowed some courts to place their 
                                                          
 205 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2269-72 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (creating a list of 40 questions raised by the majority’s newly-created factors test). 
 206 See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010); 
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 207 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.  
 208 See Layshock, 593 F.3d at 263; Snyder, 593 F.3d at 303; see also Yudof, supra note 
198, at 367-70 (indicating that Justices Fortas and Black—both of whom decided the Tinker 
case—had differing opinions about the “mission of the school.”). 
 209 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting).  
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imprimatur on threatening and other dangerous speech.210  Based on this failing, the 
Court should redefine Tinker to make it both more applicable to the Internet era and 
more supportive of schools’ educational missions.  This redefinition should include 
the following two prongs: 1) elimination of Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement and 
2) clarification of the “substantial disruption” element as a factors test.  
Presently, Tinker requires unprotected student speech to occur within the 
reasonable boundaries of the school yard.211  However, the nature of the Internet 
does not allow it to be confined to space and time since the Internet is “generally 
nowhere and everywhere at the same time . . . .”212  Due to this new technological 
reality, allowing Internet speech to remain protected simply because it is not written 
at school seems futile. Indeed, in light of this new reality, lower federal courts have 
begun to break from Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement.213  Furthermore, continued 
use of Tinker’s “on-campus” element encourages students to believe that anything 
they say and do on the Internet is protected.  This belief has increased as courts 
continue to protect the violent and offensive student Internet discourse.214  Therefore, 
to restore both the educational mission of public schools and the aura of safety 
surrounding those schools, Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement should be eliminated.  
Tinker also requires non-protected student speech to have a “substantial 
disruption” of class time.215  However, “substantial disruption” has never been given 
a precise definition.  Therefore, lower courts are left to determine for themselves 
whether a disruption is substantial enough under Tinker.  It is precisely this lack of 
clarity that accounted for the conflicting results found in Layshock and Snyder.  
Therefore, to ensure that lower courts utilize the same criteria in student speech 
cases, Tinker’s “substantial disruption” prong would be better understood as a 
factors test.  
Redefining Tinker would restore uniformity in lower court decisions by avoiding 
conflicting results on identical facts,216 as well as inform public schools of their true 
disciplinary reach.  Implementing these two revisions would ensure that courts adjust 
Tinker to the modern Internet era and thus, bring life back into an otherwise 
confusing and muddled doctrine.217 
 
                                                          
 210 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 99. 
 211 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13.  
 212 Papandrea, supra note 87, at 1090. 
 213 See sources cited supra note 137.  
 214 See sources cited supra note 99.  
 215 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.  
 216 See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 252, 263 (3d Cir. 
2010); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 291-94, 303 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 217 See Heidlage, supra note 80, at 579. 
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